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 PUBLIC MANAGEMENT ON THE GROUND: CLUSTERING MANAGERS BASED 
ON THEIR BEHAVIOR 
 
ABSTRACT 
Public management research has identified a dizzying array of management variables that affect 
organizational performance. While scholars have learned much by analyzing one or a few 
specific behavioral dimensions of public management at a time, we argue for the value of a more 
holistic and inductive approach that uses data on several aspects of public management for 
identifying manager types. Such an approach accounts for both the cognitive processes of people 
affected by management and the reality that managers’ individual behavioral decisions are 
interrelated. We examine the overlap of 21 aspects of public school management behavior using 
cluster analysis. We identify four different manager types (“firefighters,” “laissez-faire 
managers,” “administrators,” and “proactive floor managers”), each reflecting a distinct 
constellation of managerial behaviors. The manager types we call “administrators” and 
“proactive floor managers” are associated with relatively better outcomes, while “firefighters” 
are associated with relatively worse outcomes. 
INTRODUCTION 
Researchers have explored the causes and consequences of public management behavior for 
more than a century. Beginning with the classic POSDCORB, public management research is 
mostly in agreement that public management behavior is not a simple unidimensional activity, 
but rather encompasses multiple aspects. Scholars offer different lists of important aspects or 
functions of management (Boyne and Walker 2006; Ingraham, Joyce, and Donahue 2003; Terry 
2002), and theories often cluster these aspects to emphasize certain styles (Bass 1999; McGregor 
 1960; Miles and Snow 1978). Despite the lack of consensus on what management is, the 
literature is in agreement that managerial behavior matters to public service performance (Boyne 
and Walker 2006; Brewer 2006; Donahue et al. 2004; O’Toole and Meier 2011; Riccucci 2005). 
Challenges to this picture remain. Sometimes, multivariate studies that include a 
relatively broad range of managerial behavior measures find few significant effects or at best 
minor influences (e.g., Andersen and Winter 2011; Meier et al. 2015). One potential explanation 
is that contextual factors minimize the managers’ room to maneuver, thus making some  
managerial behavior more or less irrelevant (O’Toole and Meier 2015). Another possible 
explanation, however, is that even multivariate studies with long lists of independent measures of 
theoretically important aspects of management fail to capture sufficiently the complexity and 
interrelatedness of real-life managerial behaviors.                  
In contrast to the empirical findings, there is an extensive leadership and management 
literature arguing that certain management behaviors should cluster together in recognizable 
patterns. Transformational leadership and theory Y stress the use of normative incentives and 
goal commitment and discourage close supervision and negative reinforcement (Avolio and 
Yammarino 2002; Bass 1999; Burns 1978; McGregor 1960; Yukl 2010). Transactional 
leadership and the New Public Management stress the role of incentives, the creation of clear 
goals, and the delegation of means to subordinates (Burns 1978; Ferlie 1996; Hood 1995). Other 
theories of leadership and management take a contingency approach and argue that the bundle of 
appropriate management techniques depends on context. While the underlying theme of this 
literature is that effective management requires the selection of a set of compatible 
techniques/approaches/skills that might vary depending on context, the conceptual management 
definitions refer to clusters of particular management actions and behaviors. Miles and Snow 
 (1978), for example, contend that a prospecting strategy (which focuses on various behaviors 
relating to innovation and being the first adopter) should be the optimal approach in 
decentralized organizations operating in a highly turbulent environment with a consistent set of 
strategy processes. In contrast, a defending strategy (focusing on various behaviors relating to 
key products and emphasizing efficiency) works bests in centralized organizations, in stable 
environments, where clear standards and monitoring are possible.  
Although a substantial body of work has investigated these theories and approaches to 
characterizing leadership and management (Boyne and Walker 2006; Fernandez 2005; Meier et 
al. 2010), the empirical results are mixed. In a study of their parsimonious model of management 
and performance, O’Toole and Meier (2011, 275) notice that there are virtually no correlations 
among their measures of different aspects of managerial behavior. Findings such as this suggest 
that real-life public management may deviate from the characterizations of management and 
leadership theory. Quite likely, public managers approach their jobs in an eclectic manner 
adopting select behaviors from various leadership and management ideals what they perceive 
will work or is allowed in their current organization. What we do not know, however, is how 
managers themselves create their own management style (or combinations of behaviors) and 
whether some constellations of managerial behaviors are more productive and associated with 
better outcomes than others. Three empirical tasks face us: (1) capturing the multidimensionality 
of public management, (2) determining how these multiple dimensions are combined into real-
life managerial approaches (i.e., manager types), and (3) assessing the association of these 
manager types to outcomes. In practice public management involves an array of managerial 
behaviors, and the effects of public management may easily be a function of how these various 
behaviors manifest themselves in complex and highly interactive relationships. While public 
 management research provides valuable insights into key aspects of public management and their 
organizational consequences, most empirical studies fail to measure the combined impact of the 
multiple aspects of management behavior that a manager exhibits.  
This article uses cluster analysis to untangle and identify systematic patterns in public 
school managers’ combinations of managerial behaviors. In particular, the clustering approach 
allows us to examine how managers actually manage as they face the day-to-day challenges of 
their organizations. Managers in practice might pick among various management activities and 
group them differently than management theories do. Cluster analysis is a data analysis 
technique that determines the natural grouping of observations based on the observations’ degree 
of similarity in scores on variables included in the analysis (Everitt 1993; Kaufman and 
Rousseeuw 1990). We use cluster analysis on a data set of school principals containing 
numerous management variables, each capturing distinct aspects of public management 
activities. We use this data set to identify manager types and the combinations of managerial 
behaviors characterizing each manager type. In addition, we examine how the manager types we 
identify are associated with differences in four outcome indicators (i.e., student performance, 
teacher absenteeism, teacher goal commitment, and teacher job satisfaction). Testing for 
associations between the manager types and these outcomes provides a means of probing the 
general applicability and validity of using cluster analysis in the study of management-
performance relationships in public management research, since differences in managerial 
approaches are theoretically expected to be related to differences in outcomes, assuming that 
“management matters”. In addition, such tests represent an important first step for identifying the 
real-life combinations of managerial behaviors that could result in positive organizational 
outcomes.1  
 In the following sections we first catalogue various aspects of public management from 
the existing literature. Next, we outline why it can be valuable to study clusters of managers 
based on similar behaviors rather than just placing individual management variables (and 
perhaps interaction terms) in a regression model. After discussing the context and data of our 
empirical study, we then examine the clusters of school principals that emerge when we group 
together those who exhibit similar sets of management behaviors. Finally, we show how the 
different manager types are associated with variation in outcomes.   
KEY COMPONENTS OF PUBLIC MANAGEMENT 
A key concern in cluster analysis for public managers is to include as broad a range of behaviors 
as possible and let managers themselves indicate what combinations of behaviors they are using.  
Limiting the potential activities to those endorsed by one prescriptive theory or another will 
likely bias the results. Although this expansive approach can seem somewhat ad hoc and ill-
structured, this allows the managers to determine what sets of behaviors they employ and avoids 
forcing managerial behaviors into the theoretical predispositions of the analyst.  
Generally the activities of public managers can be divided into two parts: managing 
within the organization (internal management) and managing the organization’s relationships 
with the environment (external management). Both elements encompass numerous discrete 
activities and can be expected to have performance implications (Moore 1995; Thompson 1967; 
O’Toole and Meier 2011, xiii). A list of these activities and the indicators used to measure them 
are included in Table 1. 
[INSERT TABLE 1 HERE] 
Internal Management Activities 
 Internal management—or managing downward (Moore 1995)—consists of the activities that 
managers undertake in seeking to organize and coordinate people and resources to get things 
done, to reinforce and possibly enhance the routines and standard processes to generate the 
organization’s results. For most managers internal management includes many POSDCORB 
functions, ranging from human resources management and financial management to overseeing 
internal decision-making structures (Rainey 2009). Still, the enactment of several aspects of 
internal management may differ across managers, particularly in how they prioritize their work 
time in relation to different management tasks. The management literature suggests several ways 
of listing the functions and activities of managers (Allison 1983; Barnard 1938; Blake and 
Mouton 1964; Drucker 1974; Elmore 2000; Gulick and Urwick 1937; Hersey and Blanchard 
1982; Mintzberg 1973). Our list of activities in this study includes financial management, 
administrative management, professional/pedagogical management, human resources 
management, strategic management and management related to individual students.  We gather 
information both on how much time managers spend on these tasks and how much they delegate 
these tasks to subordinates.   
Human resources management is a particularly important function of managers, and we 
will focus on two subactivities: recruitment and motivating employees (O’Toole and Meier 2011; 
Rainey 2009; Yukl 2010). Attracting and developing skilled and motivated people at all levels is 
a core function in the management of public organizations’ human resources (Light 2008). A 
classic distinction in managers’ recruitment behavior is the difference between concern for 
production and concern for people (Blake and Mouton 1964). When hiring new employees, some 
managers might focus more on job applicants’ social skills and fit with the organization’s work 
culture than on their professional knowledge and skills. Managers may also differ in the use of 
 reward incentives. Tying extrinsic rewards to employee behavior and performance often poses 
greater challenges in public organizations than in private ones (e.g., Andersen and Pallesen 2008; 
Kellough and Lu 1993; Perry, Engbers, and Yun Jun 2009) because public organizations’ 
extrinsic rewards are often small in size and take the form of salary supplements or paid 
overtime. Even so, public managers may vary in using such incentives to motivate employees.  
The limits to monetary incentives in public organizations mean that managers often need 
to rely on normative appeals and gaining the trust and cooperation of employees. Different 
theoretical perspectives exist on how to manage the professional core of the organization. Le 
Grand (2010) differentiates between trust and mistrust (see also McGregor 1960). Trustful 
management is characterized by the delegation of discretionary autonomy to the employees. 
Mistrustful management is characterized by extended levels of command and control. In practice 
high levels of supervisory command and control are often difficult to obtain in public service 
agencies, effectively producing substantial employee discretion (Meyers and Nielsen 2012). A 
more subtle form of command and control that takes advantage of employee discretion is to 
establish clear task goals and monitor employee goal attainment. Similar aspects of management 
are emphasized by instructional leadership theory, but are also prevalent in general organization 
theory on managers’ task-oriented behaviors (Halpin and Weiner 1957; Katz and Kahn 1952; 
Katz, Maccoby, and Morse 1950; Likert 1961) and in studies on managerial task relations in 
terms of clarifying objectives and roles, planning work activities, and monitoring operations and 
performance (Yukl 2010). According to these lines of research, managers differ in the degree to 
which they specify goals and means of goal achievement. Hallinger (2003), who focuses on 
school management, defines four behavioral aspects of instructional management behavior: (1) 
high expectations for employees (at schools: for teachers and students), (2) supervision of the 
 professional practice (at schools: of classroom instruction), (3) coordination of employees’ 
professional practice (at schools: coordination of the school’s curriculum), and (4) monitoring of 
goal attainment (at schools: student achievement and progress).  
In sum, the literature on internal management suggests that the managerial behaviors of 
individual public managers may differ in relation to the following key components: work time 
priority in relation to managerial tasks, hands-on management versus delegation to middle 
managers, recruitment focus (concern for people versus production), use of reward incentives, 
trust (e.g., reflected in the degree of delegation to employees), and use of command and control 
(e.g., setting clear task goals and monitoring employee goal attainment). We recognize, however, 
that this list of internal management activity in Table 1 is not exhaustive. For example, internal 
management may also involve managerial behavior that relates to a manager’s supervisors within 
the organization (Moore 1995).  
External Management Activities 
External management involves managerial interactions with outside individuals and 
organizations. According to Thompson (1967), managers work in the organization’s environment 
to draw in resources and take advantage of opportunities for the agency and its mandated 
programs while also protecting the core organizational tasks from disruption triggered by 
external shocks. External management, therefore, can be divided into efforts to exploit 
opportunities in the environment through network activities (networking) and efforts to buffer 
the organization from threats that the environment might generate (buffering).   
Organizations are open systems. The resources, opportunities, challenges, and constraints 
emanating from their surroundings can greatly influence management and performance. 
Managers’ interaction with the world outside is thus an important aspect of public management. 
 Externally oriented networking reflects how much effort managers exert to tap and coordinate 
opportunities in the external world, attempt to fend off threats or disturbances from outside, or 
both (O’Toole and Pedersen 2011). In addition, many public organizations have some sort of 
board of either advisory or supervisory character. Organizations with such a board may vary in 
how proactively the manager involves the board in decision-making.  
Moreover, protecting public organizations from disruption is a core managerial function 
(O’Toole and Meier 2011; Thompson 1967). Studies of strategic management explore a 
“defender” approach to dealing with the organizational environment (Miles and Snow 1978). 
The main purpose of defender (buffering) activities is to protect the core activity of the 
organization against interruptions from its environment. In public agencies, buffering might take 
place at two levels: upward (buffering interruptions from political and administrative principals) 
and downward (buffering interruptions from clients and users). Focus on both networking and 
buffering might very well differ from manager to manager.                
Finally, public management research emphasizes proactive and entrepreneurial aspects of 
public management (Borins 1998, 2008; Light 1998; Linden 1990). Entrepreneurial initiatives 
often ask the employees to change behavior and may thus be seen as an internal management 
activity. On the other hand, proactivity and new initiatives may also be used for sending signals 
to the external environment or act as a buffer against other external initiatives. While proactive 
and entrepreneurial managerial behaviors cannot be clearly defined as either internal or external 
management, public managers may differ in the extent to which they exercise them.         
In summary, the public management literature provides us with a long list of management 
behavior concepts. Measuring all aspects of internal and external management would be a 
Herculean task; we instead aim to select a list of behaviors that is relatively varied and 
 comprehensive. Based on our above review, we identify a set of behavioral dimensions outlined 
in Table 1 as key components and include them in our study. Our cluster analysis thus relies on a 
comprehensive—but not exhaustive—selection of management variables.      
COMBINING ASPECTS OF PUBLIC MANAGEMENT 
Our analysis sorts school managers into different types based on their behavior along a number 
of dimensions of management. An obvious alternative approach would be to study the 
independent effect of each aspect of management (by including all dimensions as independent 
variables in a regression). We believe there is value in using cluster analysis to consider multiple 
dimensions in concert for at least four reasons. First, organizational structures and processes may 
often have complex interaction effects on performance. Interaction effects can take the form of 
complementary behaviors, when one particular managerial action is ineffective unless it is 
accompanied by another action. For example, affording substantial autonomy to middle 
managers or street-level employees might yield higher organizational performance, but only if 
adequate monitoring mechanisms are in place to discourage shirking. In addition to 
complements, certain behaviors might serve as substitutes or be completely incompatible with 
one another. Research suggests that incentivizing employees through pay for performance is 
unlikely to be particularly effective if employees work in groups, if the organization hires 
employees who are intrinsically motivated in their work, or if employees trust and feel respected 
by their managers under certain conditions (Langbein 2010). The many opportunities for 
organizational processes to serve as complements or substitutes suggest that managerial actions 
may have important interaction effects. While our cluster analysis approach does not directly 
estimate individual interaction effects, it does account for the joint effect (including any 
 interaction effects) of the various managerial dimensions when they exhibit a pattern 
characteristic of a given manager type. 
Of course, examining managerial clusters is not the only means of accounting for 
complementary and substitutionary dimensions of management; individual interaction effects 
can be directly modeled with interaction terms. A second reason for examining managerial 
clusters is that it provides an alternative method that reduces the need to impose pre-existing 
assumptions on the study of management. Using interaction terms to account for all potential 
interaction effects is impractical and may at worst result in model specification error when there 
are a large number of management variables. For example, say that we operate with just four 
management variables (A-D). Regression analysis that accounts for all potential interaction 
effects would require the inclusion of 11 interaction terms (AB, AC, AD, BC, BD, CD, ABC, 
ABD, ACD, BCD, and ABCD)—and the required number of interaction terms would increase 
exponentially with each additional management variable. Including several interactions terms in 
a single model increases the risk of severe multicollinearity, which in turn can inflate the 
variance of the coefficient estimates and make the estimates very sensitive to minor changes in 
the model. Given the large number of potentially-interconnected management dimensions that 
could be examined, researchers must therefore adopt some means of identifying a limited set of 
relationships that can reasonably be tested. One approach is to rely on theory to guide selection 
of key dimensions of managerial behavior as well as identification of key interactions among 
dimensions (e.g., O’Toole and Meier 2011). Many theories of management such as 
transformational leadership identify broad behavioral patterns that some managers are believed 
to adopt. Theory-driven empirical research constitutes a crucial component of scholarly inquiry 
in the field of public management, but the strength of the approach in many ways depends on the 
 strength of the theory motivating the model. Managers in practice might well pick among various 
management activities and group them differently than management theories do. The cluster 
analysis-based approach that we employ is more inductive (in the sense that it relies less on the 
judgment of the researcher to choose which managerial dimensions to include and which to 
interact). The clustering approach will reveal how managers actually manage as they face the 
day-to-day challenges of their organizations. We advocate this approach as a complement to—
not a replacement of—empirical research that employs more explicitly theory-driven model 
specification. 
A third (and somewhat overlapping) reason to derive manager types based on 
combinations of managerial behaviors is that doing so reflects how humans within organizations 
naturally perceive management. The recipients of management behavior—primarily, but not 
exclusively, subordinates—do not perceive and react to individual aspects of managerial 
behavior, but rather consider the full set of interrelated managerial behaviors facing them. This 
argument becomes especially relevant when measuring results that are the product of multiple 
behavioral acts (such as student performance, student absenteeism, and teacher absenteeism) or 
multiple psychological states of mind (such as job satisfaction). Cognitive models of 
management performance appraisal (DeCotiis and Petit 1978; DeNisi 1996; DeNisi, Cafferty, 
and Meglino 1984; Feldman 1981; Ilgen and Feldman 1983) have focused on raters’ 
(subordinates’) cognitive processes. These models, borrowing heavily from social psychology 
research on social cognition and interpersonal perception, look at how raters recognize, attend to, 
and observe ratee (manager) behavior and subsequently represent, organize, and store this 
information in memory, retrieve the information from memory, and integrate the information to 
form a judgment of the ratee (manager). Among other things, the literature shows that raters’ 
 psychological schemas shape what they attend to and that these schemas are built on prior and 
spillover effects among experiences (Fleenor et al. 2010). Subordinates may thus remember and 
combine multiple aspects of management behavior when forming their work behavior. One 
potential consequence is that employees may be able to forgive lack of skills on one dimension if 
the manager is “good” on others. Real-life managers have different strength and weaknesses; 
hardly anyone is omnipotent. Theoretically, we expect that employees respond to managers 
holistically rather than always responding to individual managerial behaviors in an additive 
manner.  
A final reason to look at manager types derived on the basis of combinations of 
managerial behaviors is that managers face resource constraints, in turn forcing tradeoffs among 
competing priorities or activities. Cognitive and time constraints mean that managerial attention 
to one issue will sometimes come at the expense of other activities. For example, managers who 
devote more time to external networking may have less time available for internal management 
activities (Hicklin, O’Toole, and Meier 2008). Traditional regression procedures consider the 
effect of varying each independent variable while holding all other independent variables 
constant, even though it may not be practically feasible in many scenarios for managers to hold 
all other variables constant while increasing (or decreasing) one management variable. Cluster 
analysis allows us to identify sets of individuals who adopt similar holistic patterns of behavior 
across several variables. If the tradeoffs adopted by certain managers are more effective than the 
tradeoffs of other managers, the combinations of behaviors resulting from more effective 
tradeoffs should be associated with improved outcomes. For example, consider a world with four 
dimensions of management. Imagine there is a set of managers who exhibit high levels of 
external networking and internal goal-setting activity; since these two activities consume most of 
 their cognitive and time resources, these same managers exhibit low levels of external buffering 
and internal hands-on management activity. A second set of managers exhibits the exact opposite 
pattern of behavior (high levels of buffering and hands-on internal management; low levels of 
networking and goal-setting). Traditional regression approaches allow one to estimate the effect 
of varying each managerial dimension while holding the other three constant. But if we want to 
study which holistic managerial approach is more effective, we would first need to define the 
two sets of managers (using cluster analysis, for example) and then see which set of managers 
was associated with better performance. 
EMPIRICAL CONTEXT AND DATA SOURCES 
The empirical analyses proceed in two stages. First, we examine how public school managers 
group in relation to different manager types based on their management behaviors. As 
mentioned, the expectation is that individual school managers will exhibit different constellations 
of managerial behavior and, hence, form distinct manager types. Then we assess whether and 
how these clusters are associated with differences in outcomes.  
The setting of public secondary schooling in Denmark provides a suitable context for a 
conservative test since the effect of management is expected to be relatively weak in this context. 
First, Denmark has a national culture denoted by a relatively small power distance (Hofstede 
1983, 1980), and public schools have been marked by a tradition of “weak” management at the 
local level; e.g., school principals have been perceived as a primus inter pares. Historically, the 
teachers’ extent of work autonomy has thus been very wide. Teachers in Denmark may thus be 
less susceptible to their school principal’s instructions than teachers elsewhere—a factor 
potentially lessening the importance of management to school and teacher outcomes.   
  Second, Danish school principals have less authority than school principals in most other 
countries—mainly caused by corporatism in the policy formulation and implementation process. 
Teachers’ unions are heavily involved in both the formulation of schooling legislation and the 
implementation of educational policy at the local level. Moreover, the school principals’ 
authority is limited by substantial influences from formalized arrangements with local branches 
of the teachers’ union, the teacher union representative at each school, or both (Meier et al. 
2015). In addition, the public schools are governed by multipurpose municipalities. Within a few 
general constraints the municipal council may decide the annual school budgets. Local 
politicians may also set strategic objectives for the schools in the municipality and take 
initiatives in terms of the teaching methods used in those schools. Again, relatively low levels of 
decision-making authority among Danish school principals may work to lessen the role of 
management for explaining school and teacher outcomes.  
The restraints and limits on Danish school principals thus suggest that management will 
not matter as much when compared to managers in other sectors or countries. In such cases, there 
will not be as much focus by organizations in having a consistent management style that is 
adapted to the organization simply because management will receive less attention compared to 
other organizational factors. Danish school principals are, therefore, a conservative test of the 
value of cluster analysis for examining public manager types and their associations with 
organizational outcomes. If various management clusters are linked to different levels of 
performance in Danish schools, we expect the approach will prove fruitful in a wide variety of 
other management contexts.  
We also recognize that the features of the Danish setting may impose limitations on the 
generalizability of our results. The exact extent to which our findings can be extrapolated to 
 other sectors and countries is ultimately an empirical question for future research, but we think 
that the characteristics of the Danish case (e.g., strong unions, lack of hierarchical control, 
absence of pay for performance) may fit a lot of situations, such as New York city schools, 
Korean schools, and police departments.  
Data 
We use a mix of different data sources, i.e., three separate survey data sets—comprising 
information on school principals, schools, and teachers—and an administrative data set on 
schools and students. The Danish National Centre for Social Research (SFI) provided the survey 
data. The SFI conducted the school principal and school surveys in March 2011 and conducted 
the teacher survey in May 2011. Statistics Denmark provided the administrative data, which 
contains detailed information on all Danish schools for the 2010-2011 school year, including 
student-level test scores from summer 2011 and background characteristics. 
To test how public school managers cluster into different manager types, we use the SFI 
school principal survey responses to questions about the principal’s own management team’s 
behavior along each dimension we identified above in Table 1. All public lower secondary 
school principals in Denmark (1,478) were invited to participate in a web-based survey. The 
response rate was 50 percent, for a total of 742 respondents. The sample appears representative 
of the total population of Danish public school principals: Two-group t-tests reveal no 
statistically significant differences between respondents and non-respondents in terms of average 
school performance (students’ test score achievements at the final ninth-grade exams), ethnicity, 
parental education, distribution of students, and school size (number of students at the school). 
Still, we cannot reject that the respondents may differ from non-respondents in terms of 
unobservable characteristics. While the issue of sampling bias presents a potential problem to 
 most survey-based research with less than a full response rate, our findings should be interpreted 
in perspective of this limitation. Specifically, it is possible that our results best describe mangers 
with personality traits (such as pro-social or ego-based traits that motivate them to tell us about 
their management practices) that make them inclined to respond to surveys. 
In order to probe the general applicability and validity of using cluster analysis in the 
study of public management, we test the relationship between manager types and outcomes. We 
draw the outcome measures from different data sources that we merge onto the SFI school 
principal survey data using a national school identification system denoting each school by a 
unique six-digit number. By drawing our management variables and our outcome measures from 
separate data sources, we minimize concerns about common source bias (Favero and Bullock 
2015; Meier and O’Toole 2013). 
The key outcome we examine is student performance, since student learning is typically 
considered to be the primary objective of schools. Student performance is measured by the 
average student test score achievements on the ninth-grade final written exams for Danish and 
math in summer 2011 (i.e., after the collection of the SFI survey data).2 The test scores are 
recorded in the administrative Statistics Denmark school data and come from nationally 
standardized written tests that 98 percent of all Danish ninth-grade students take (Andersen 
2005). All scores are given by an external third party.  
Though the primary objective of schools is to educate students, they have a number of 
other social goals—what might be termed intermediate management outcomes. Organizations 
often face tradeoffs between competing goals, and some managerial approaches may have 
differing effects on different dimensions of performance. Given the broader set of concerns that 
schools face, we examine three alternative measures of intermediate management outcomes that 
 reflect the experiences of the employees within the schools: teacher absenteeism, goal 
commitment, and job satisfaction. Teacher absenteeism is measured using the SFI school survey 
data.3 We use the numerical responses (number of days) to a survey item capturing the average 
short-term absenteeism due to illness among the teachers in the school year of 2009-2010. While 
the management clusters are based on school principal data from 2011, the absenteeism measure 
refers to the previous school year. To the extent that managerial practices in 2011 are a good 
proxy for managerial practices in the prior year, this temporal ordering should be acceptable for a 
correlational (as opposed to causal) empirical study. Nonetheless, our findings concerning the 
association of management clusters to teacher absenteeism should be interpreted in light of this 
caveat.    
Teacher goal commitment and job satisfaction are measured using the SFI teacher survey 
data.4 We measure both variables with continuous scales comprising five (goal commitment) and 
three (job satisfaction) survey items. We generate each scale using the predicted factor scores of 
a principal component analysis, which produces indexes that are standardized (mean = 0, 
standard deviation = 1). School-level measures of goal commitment and job satisfaction were 
created by taking the mean of all survey responses within each school. Descriptive statistics on 
all four outcome measures appear in the Appendix, Table A-2. We focus on these four measures 
because they represent salient organizational outcomes and have been the subject of numerous 
public administration and management studies (e.g., see Bhatti et al. 2015; Favero et al. 2016a, 
2016b; Jilke 2016; Latham et al. 2008; Pedersen 2015). Yet we recognize that other school 
performance goals may be equally important (e.g., student well-being and social mobility).  
Unfortunately, efforts systematically to gather data on these other goals did not occur until after 
2011, the time of the survey. 
  All statistical models on the linkage between manager types and outcomes include a set 
of control variables capturing potentially confounding influences. These control variables are 
from the administrative Statistics Denmark school data and the SFI school principal survey. In 
particular, we control for between-school student heterogeneity using measures on the proportion 
of female students, average student age at the time of tests, proportion of non-ethnic Danish 
students, average age of students’ parents at time of birth, proportion of students living with both 
parents, and average education of students’ parents. Similarly, we include school variables 
capturing school size (number of students), number of teachers, number of middle managers, 
proportion of female teachers, and average age of teachers. Finally, we control for school 
principal heterogeneity in terms of gender, ethnicity, age, years of tenure, and years of prior 
experience as a school teacher. 
CLUSTERING MANAGERS 
Several cluster analysis techniques exist, each with many specific methods (Everitt et al. 2011; 
Gordon 1999). We employ kmeans cluster analysis. In kmeans clustering a predetermined 
number of clusters (k) are defined using an iterative process. Each sample observation is 
assigned to the group whose means (for the various variables) are the closest (using a Euclidean 
distance). Based on that categorization new group means are then determined. These steps 
continue until no observations change groups. We chose kmeans over alternative methods for 
several reasons. First, kmeans clustering is a well-established partition clustering method that has 
been successfully used with a range of topics (see Everitt et al. 2011; Gordon 1999). Second, the 
method is relatively easy to implement and can be applied even on large data sets—meaning that 
kmeans may be good choice for other researchers wishing to engage in cluster analysis research. 
Finally, kmeans appears well-suited for identifying manager types, as the method generates 
 clusters that are flat (non-hierarchical)5 and globular (the members of the clusters typically bear 
resemblance to the mean of the cluster). 
Our cluster analysis incorporates 21 management variables, each capturing distinct 
aspects of management activities. Using the SFI school principal survey data, we selected items 
that relate to key aspects of managerial behavior (see the previous section on key components of 
public management and Table 1). We transform our data when two or more survey items refer to 
the same underlying management activity to generate a single measure (the scaling method is 
described in the Appendix, Table A-1). We make this transformation so as to clarify the 
management characteristics of the individual manager types. In cases of missing values on a 
survey item constituting a multi-item measure, we use the mean of that respondent’s answer(s) 
on the other item(s) relating to that management measure. To keep variables with high variability 
from dominating the analysis, we standardize all scale measures (mean = 0, standard deviation = 
1). This standardization also aids the identification of general differences in management 
characteristics across clusters. An overview of the individual survey items appears in the 
Appendix, Table A-1. 
We conduct the cluster analysis on an effective sample of 465 observations (the number 
of school principal observations not containing “missing values” in relation to any of the 21 
management variables). Two-group t-tests suggest that the 465 school principals are not 
statistically different from the full population of Danish school principals in terms of average 
school performance, ethnicity, parental education, distribution of students, and school size. 
 We estimate the clustering of school principals in relation to four cluster groups. 
Determining the number of clusters (k) in kmeans cluster analysis is a much debated issue 
(Everitt et al. 2011; Gordon 1999). Essentially, the “true” k property of our data set is unknown, 
 yet it must be specified. In line with general practice, we decided on a four-group solution based 
on diagnostic checks (comparing Calinski-Harabasz (1974) pseudo-F estimates when k is set to 
two, three, four, and five) and the relevance of a clustering resolution allowing for a possible 
display of several manager types.6   
Results 
 The cluster analysis on the 21 management variables estimates the clustering of each school 
principal in relation to one of four separate manager types. For the purpose of this article we 
refer to the four types as C1, C2, C3, and C4. The cluster analysis yields the following 
distribution of school principal observations: 157 (C1), 50 (C2), 131 (C3), and 127 (C4). In order 
to identify the characteristics of each manager type, we estimate the mean score for each 
manager type in relation to each of the 21 management variables. Because the management 
variables are all standardized (mean = 0, standard deviation = 1), a negative mean score indicates 
a relatively lower value for that particular management variable while a positive mean score 
signifies a relatively higher value.  
For each management variable we use one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) to test for 
significant differences in means across the manager types. We also use Bonferroni-Dunn 
multiple-comparison tests to check for significant mean differences for each pairwise 
constellation of manager types.  
Table 2 shows the results. In each of the four manager type columns the first score shows 
the mean management variable score for that particular manager type. Standard deviations 
appear in parentheses. The brackets hold the results of Bonferroni-Dunn tests for mean 
differences at the five-percent significance level. The bracket notation should be decoded as 
follows. Take, e.g., the first management measure “Delegation of decision-making authority to 
 middle managers.” For C1 the mean score is -.023 and the bracket notation is “<C2;>C3.” This 
notation implies that the C1 mean score is significantly smaller than the mean score of C2 (.717), 
yet significantly larger than the mean score of C3 (-.503). Similarly, the bracket notation for C2 
(“>all”) denotes that the C2 mean score is significantly larger than the mean score of the other 
three manager types. Column “p>F” shows the ANOVA results. 
[INSERT TABLE 2 HERE] 
The ANOVA results show significantly different mean scores across the four manager types for 
19 of the 21 management variables. Only management activities relating to school board 
involvement in decision-making and use of reward incentives are statistically insignificant (at p 
< .05).  
We use the Bonferroni-Dunn test results to describe and label the four manager types. 
First, we have the 157 school principals marked by membership in the C1 manager type. We 
label these managers “firefighters.” Overall, these school principals spend much of their work 
time handling cases related to individual students and personnel management. And they do not 
hold high expectations regarding their students’ academic performance, do not emphasize social 
skills or organizational culture in hiring, and express little trust that the teachers will exert their 
best work efforts. Despite particularly low confidence in their teachers, these managers do not 
place a greater-than-average emphasis on dialoguing with teachers about pedagogical practices. 
Instead, they appear to manage by objectives and written plans. As a result of spending their time 
on student and personnel matters, this type of manager is less focused on financial, 
administrative, and strategic management. Perhaps many of the managers adopting this 
combination of behaviors do so because they feel overwhelmed by the day-to-day problems that 
 arise within their organization and are simply trying to keep up by attending to the most pressing 
issue in front of them. 
 Second, we have the 50 school principals affiliated with the C2 manager type. These 
managers are best described as “laissez-faire managers.” These managers embody a somewhat 
passive form of management. They exhibit extensive delegation to middle managers and a non-
interventionist approach to personnel management: i.e., they are less preoccupied with setting 
goals, and using objectives and written plans; they are less guided by formal school legislation 
and rules; they are less engaged with “buffering” behavior when teachers experience conflicts 
with students’ parents; and they do not express high expectations for the school’s performance. 
At the same time, they are not particularly hesitant to provide general feedback to teachers 
(although they appear to shy away from becoming involved in detailed discussions of 
pedagogical practices). Their general non-interventionist approach does not appear to stem from 
an exceptionally strong confidence in the teachers’ drive and expertise; these managers exhibit 
slightly below-average levels of trust in teachers and do not invite teachers to participate in 
hiring or goal-setting decisions. This small cluster of managers is overall unengaged in the 
details of school operations, which could be motivated by disillusionment, lack of self-
confidence, laziness, or a principled belief in a hands-off philosophy of management. 
 Third, we have the 131 school principals of the C3 manager type. We refer to these 
managers as “administrators”—school principals who are best characterized as more traditional 
office desk managers. Specifically, these managers make most school decisions themselves (less 
delegation to middle managers), engage in little networking, and spend more time on financial 
and administrative management tasks and less on personnel management. They are less focused 
on strategic and proactive (innovation) management and on monitoring of school goal 
 achievement. They have high expectations for the school’s performance, but provide less 
feedback to the teachers on teaching, teaching methods, and handling problems in specific 
classes—possibly because they have high trust that the teachers will exert their best work efforts. 
They are, however, engaged with “buffering” behavior early on when teachers experience 
conflicts with students’ parents. These managers lack the laissez-faire manager’s aversion to 
involving teachers in decision making, which may also be due to their greater trust in teachers. 
The overall pattern of behaviors exhibited by these managers may be motivated by an assertive 
technocratic approach that emphasizes process over strategy or outcomes. 
 Finally, we have the 127 school principals marked by membership in the C4 manager 
type. We categorize these managers as “proactive floor managers.” These school principals 
invest less of their work time in financial and administrative management but are more focused 
on strategic and proactive (innovative) management. In contrast to the administrator type 
managers they employ more modern management techniques; i.e., they engage in goal-setting 
behavior, performance management (monitoring of goal accomplishment), and “management by 
objectives.” They also delegate to middle managers and create written plans. Moreover, these 
managers have high expectations for the academic performance of the school and great trust that 
the teachers exert their best work efforts. They are involved in the teachers’ teaching practices 
and methods but also appear to involve the teachers in the decision-making process to a wide 
extent. These managers might view their role first and foremost as that of a leader (as opposed to 
a decision maker) whose job it is to inspire and focus their employees on achieving desired 
outcomes (Favero, Meier, and O’Toole 2016a). 
ASSOCIATION OF CLUSTERS WITH OUTCOMES 
 If the manager types we generated reflect meaningful differences in managerial approaches, we 
expect them to be related to differences in outcomes, assuming that “management matters.” 
Based on the cluster analysis results we compute a set of dummy variables denoting the manager 
type affiliation of each school principal. We use these variables to test the relationship of 
manager types with outcomes. Specifically, we estimate the following equation by OLS 
regression:   
𝑌𝑖   =   𝑐 + 𝑀
′
𝑖𝛽1 + 𝑋
′
𝑖𝛽2 + 𝜖𝑖 
The outcome (Y) of school i is a function of manager type (M) and a vector of student, school, 
and school principal characteristics (X). 𝛽1 signifies the association of manager type to outcome 
Y. As previously discussed, we test the association of manager types with student performance as 
well as three other intermediate managerial outcome measures (which are only weakly correlated 
with one another):7 teacher absenteeism, goal commitment, and job satisfaction. 
The OLS regression analyses are performed at the school level with robust standard 
errors. As a result, schools with a larger number of respondents allow for a more precise estimate 
of the true level (mean) of goal commitment or job satisfaction among all teachers within the 
school. In order to account for this variance in the precision of our measures, the individual 
observations in our regressions are weighted by the number of respondents when the dependent 
variable is goal commitment or job satisfaction (“aweight” option in Stata). Because our 
dependent variables come from data sources other than the SFI school principal survey, the 
regression analyses are based on subsamples (i.e., the effective n is lower than 465). 
Results for the Impact of Clusters 
Table 3 summarizes the results of the OLS regressions. The first column displays estimates for 
our main model, which predicts student performance. We made the first manager type 
 (“firefighters”) the reference group, so the coefficients for the other three manager types indicate 
their effect relative to the first cluster manager type. The student performance measure has a 
standard deviation of about one. The manager type coefficients thus reflect the strength of 
association in terms of standard deviations. For example, schools with “administrators” are 
associated with student performance that is .318 of a standard deviation higher than schools with 
“firefighters.” A joint F-test finds that the three manager type dummy variables are jointly 
significant (F[3, 295] = 2.94; p>F = .0335), meaning that we can reject the null hypothesis that 
none of the manager types are related to student performance (after controlling for the various 
other factors included in our model). The positive and significant coefficients for manager types 
C2 through C4 indicate that C1 “firefighters” are associated with lower levels of student 
performance than each of the other three manager types. Of the three manager type coefficients 
the one for C3 “administrators” is the largest; however, it is not readily apparent from looking at 
Table 3 whether or not we can reliably conclude that the effect of C3 is more favorable than the 
effects of C2 and C4. We can easily determine whether there are significant differences between 
the other manager types by changing the reference (omitted) category and then re-estimating the 
equation, as we have done in Table A-3 in the Appendix. We find that there are no significant 
differences in effects between C2, C3, and C4, even though all three are associated with 
significantly more favorable student performance than C1 “firefighters.” 
[INSERT TABLE 3 HERE] 
In order to investigate further the ability of the manager type variables uniquely to explain 
variation in student performance, we ran a regression (not shown) that was identical to the one 
shown in the first column of Table 3, except that we also included all of the individual 
management variables used in the cluster analysis as independent variables. This is a particularly 
 tough test of the association between manager types and outcomes given the multicollinearity 
that is likely to be present after including the large number of management variables used to 
construct the manager types. Even after controlling for the linear effects of all of the individual 
management variables, the types contribute significantly to our ability to explain student 
performance; an F-test demonstrates that the three manager type dummies are jointly significant 
(F[3, 274] = 3.49; p>F = .0161). This suggests that the individual management variables do not 
contribute to student performance in a strictly linear, additive manner. The manager types 
explain variation in the school outcome measure beyond what the raw management variables 
used to form the clusters can explain individually in a simple linear regression. In sum, the 
results for the student performance models support the convergent validity of the manager 
clusters since they confirm expectations that the clusters would be uniquely associated with 
student outcomes.  
Table 3 also shows results from models drawing on our three measures of intermediate 
managerial outcomes as dependent variables. The coefficients relating to teacher absenteeism 
show the strength of association in terms of average number of days of short-term absenteeism 
per teacher. As with the student performance measure, the coefficients relating to teacher goal 
commitment and satisfaction reflect the strength of association in terms of one standard 
deviation. F-tests indicate that the manager types dummies are jointly significant in the teacher 
absenteeism model (F[3, 225] = 3.34; p>F = .0202) and the goal commitment model (F[3, 176] = 
3.97; p>F = .0091), but not the job satisfaction model (F[3, 176] = 1.80; p>F = .1487). The F-
tests thus offer no support for the notion that teacher job satisfaction is a mediating factor in the 
link between manager type and student performance. When all of the individual management 
 variables are added to these models (not shown), the manager cluster dummies retain their joint 
significance only in the goal commitment model (F[3, 155] = 4.44; p>F = .0050). 
The full set of binary comparisons among manager types for each model is again reported 
in Table A-3 of the Appendix. Teacher absenteeism is significantly higher (worse) in schools 
where there is a C1 “firefighter” than those headed by a C3 “administrator.” The C2 “laissez-
faire managers” see higher levels of absenteeism than C3 “administrators” or C4 “proactive floor 
managers.” Teacher goal commitment also appears to suffer under the C1 “firefighter.” The 
other three manager types are all associated with higher levels of goal commitment. Among 
those three there are no significant differences. There is also some evidence at the binary 
comparison level that teachers are less satisfied under C1 “firefighters” (relative to C3 
“administrators” or C4 “proactive floor managers”), although the manager type variables are not 
jointly significant in this model (as noted above).  
The magnitudes of these associations are modest but meaningful. For student 
performance, teacher goal commitment, and teacher job satisfaction, a school with a C3 
“administrator” is expected to be approximately a third of a standard deviation above a school 
with a C1 “firefighter” (these two types provide the largest difference in predicted values for all 
three of these dependent variables). The effects for teacher absenteeism are slightly larger. The 
average teacher in the average school is absent five days a year (for short-term reasons), and the 
school-level average has a standard deviation of three days. C2 “laissez-faire managers” are 
associated with 1.8 additional absent days per teacher relative to C3 “administrators” and C4 
“proactive floor managers.” 
The results for the three managerial intermediate outcome models provide further support 
for the general applicability and validity of using cluster analysis in the study of public 
 management. Across all four outcomes C3 “administrators” and C4 “proactive floor managers” 
appear to be associated with the most success. Their schools have better student performance, 
lower rates of employee absenteeism, stronger employee goal commitment, and higher job 
satisfaction than at least one other manager type on each dimension. C1 “firefighters,” on the 
other hand, are associated with the worst outcomes. C2 “laissez-faire managers” land somewhere 
in between. They are associated with better student performance and stronger teacher goal 
commitment than C1 “firefighters,” but their schools also have higher rates of teacher 
absenteeism than C3 “administrators” or C4 “proactive floor managers.”8 
CONCLUSION 
The complexity and interconnectedness of the many decisions made by public managers demand 
that empirical researchers make simplifying assumptions regarding how to measure and classify 
managerial behavior. In this article, we employ cluster analysis to identify manager types 
reflecting patterns in public school managers’ combinations of managerial behaviors. This novel 
approach to the empirical study of public management is useful for expanding and 
complementing findings from studies using other sets of simplifying empirical assumptions. The 
analysis reveals four school principal manager types: “firefighters,” “laissez-faire managers,” 
“administrators,” and “proactive floor managers.” The “firefighters” are preoccupied with cases 
related to individual service user problems and personnel management, and they are less focused 
on building organizational culture. “Laissez-faire managers” embody a somewhat passive form 
of management, while the “administrators” are best characterized as more traditional office desk 
managers. Finally, the “proactive floor managers” invest less of their time in financial and 
administrative management and employ more modern management techniques; i.e., they engage 
in goal-setting behavior, performance management (monitoring of goal accomplishment), and 
 “management by objectives,” and they are involved in the teachers’ teaching practices/methods 
while involving the teachers in decision-making process to a wide extent.   
The results of the cluster analysis (a fairly inductive approach) do not match the patterns 
of behavior advocated by prescriptive theories of management. Contrasting the managerial 
clusters found here with those advocated by Miles and Snow (1978) serves to illustrate this point. 
Superficially our “proactive floor managers” resemble Miles and Snow prospectors. Similar to 
prospectors, proactive managers are interested in innovation and strategic issues. Unlike 
prospectors, however, they do not favor decentralization as much as the laissez-faire 
administrators and their levels of buffering the environment are below average. “Administrators” 
also share some superficial behaviors with defenders (concern with financial management, 
centralization/lack of delegation, and buffering). However, they do not appear to focus on 
efficiency and core tasks; in fact, they appear to avoid involvement in teaching or monitoring 
teaching at all. “Firefighters” are indeed reactors, but they do not wait for the environment to 
force them to react as Miles and Snow would contend, rather they react to immediate problems 
within the organization and actually spend a bit more time in buffering the environment rather 
than just reacting. “Laissez-faire managers,” who might be managers in name only, have no 
counterpart in Miles and Snow; they clearly are not analyzers (the Miles and Snow mixed fourth 
type).   
The contrast of the managerial types from Miles and Snow with our four clusters could 
be repeated with other prescriptive theories of management. For example, the clustering does not 
produce a clear theory X or theory Y manager; there are no obvious transformational leaders, and 
no pure management by objectives managers. In sum, our results suggest that managers tend to 
pick and choose from a range of managerial behaviors and borrow activities from different 
 theoretical approaches. Managers do not exhibit patterns of behavior that match with existing 
prescriptive theories of management. The clustering suggests that scholars should exercise 
caution in imposing patterns of behavior on managers whose view of what works is likely 
affected by their personal experiences with the organization that they manage.  
As expected, there are some differences in outcomes among the four identified manager 
types. “Administrators” and “proactive floor managers” are generally associated with better 
outcomes than “firefighters.” “Laissez-faire managers” fall somewhere in between—their 
schools have higher levels of academic performance and teacher goal commitment than schools 
with “firefighters,” but “laissez-faire managers” are also associated with high levels of teacher 
absenteeism. That the very passive “laissez-faire managers” are associated with more success 
than “firefighters” on two outcome measures is somewhat surprising. Perhaps the extremely low 
levels of trust in teachers among “firefighters” reflect a particularly dysfunctional relationship 
between management and personnel (that may include micromanagement). What appears to be 
passivity among “laissez-faire managers” could, in fact, be the implementation of a principled 
division of responsibility between management and the front-line professionals in the school. In 
addition, the observed associations between manager type and outcome could partially be a 
function of path dependency or the organization’s environment. Managers are not necessarily 
completely free to choose their management style. For example, external factors may force some 
managers to become “firefighters”—or entail that “firefighters” do not have the time to be, say, 
“proactive floor managers.” 
It is somewhat striking how similar the results for “administrators” and “proactive floor 
managers” are across all four outcomes (there are no significant differences) given how different 
the two managerial clusters are. While both types have high expectations and high levels of trust 
 in teachers, “administrators” put a much smaller emphasis on managing through goals and on 
dialoguing with teachers about their practices, instead focusing on financial and administrative 
management. To whatever extent these associations reflect causal relationships, they suggest that 
there may be more than one “right way” to manage an organization. 
In relation to the latter, we wish to emphasize that the associations between manager type 
and outcome that we identify are correlational. Because our data is observational (non-
experimental), our results do not allow a direct causal interpretation. For example, the data show 
that “firefighters” are associated with relative poor performance, but we cannot disentangle 
whether this association is a product of “firefighting” causing poor performance or poor 
performance causing “firefighting.” In theory, “firefighting” may be the most effective 
management approach for the schools where the managers exhibit this management style. While 
our findings are insightful, consistent with existing theory, and support the value and usefulness 
of cluster analysis to the study of public management, we thus strongly encourage further 
research that may complement our cluster analysis and findings with causal evidence. For 
example, future research could invite a sample of “firefighters” to participate in a management 
training program involving key components of “proactive floor” management. Effects could be 
identified in an experimental setting with random assignment of treatment (training) and control 
(no training) or via a quasi-experimental difference-in-differences design (comparing changes in 
performance for “firefighter” training recipients relative to other types of managers not receiving 
any training).Our findings are based on Danish school management data. This empirical focus is 
suitable for showing how cluster analysis is a useful technique for identifying manager types, not 
least as it provides the setting for a conservative test. We recognize, however, the limitations to 
external validity of this choice of data. School management may retain characteristics different 
 from other fields of public management. Moreover, the behavioral characteristics of Danish 
school principals may differ from those of school principals in other countries. Future research 
should thus use cluster analysis to identify manager types in areas of public service other than 
schooling and in other countries. As previously mentioned, we suggest that the characteristics of 
the Danish case (e.g., strong unions, lack of hierarchical control, the absence of pay for 
performance) may fit a lot of situations, such as New York City schools, Korean schools, and 
police departments. At the same time, some managerial clusters such as proactive management 
appear to have much stronger support in the theoretical literature than either laissez faire 
managers or firefighters.  In addition, future research should also examine how the manager 
types, identified via cluster analysis, relate to other outcomes than the ones that we examine. 
In sum, this article demonstrates a novel means of accounting for the multidimensionality 
of managerial behavior. We argue that cluster analysis is a useful tool for research on the causes 
and consequences of interconnected managerial behaviors, with a view to how various behaviors 
combine in real-life public organizations. Having said that, we are well aware of the limitations 
of cluster analysis. Empirical analysis of all aspects of public management is a Herculean feat. 
This article focuses on key components of internal and external management, but we recognize 
that our selection of management variables is not exhaustive. That the results of cluster analysis 
are a derivative of the selected number of cluster groups and variables included is a substantial 
caveat that makes replication and cross-country comparisons difficult. For these reasons we 
mainly see cluster analysis as a first—but nevertheless important—step to untangle and identify 
systematic patterns in managers’ combinations of behavioral dimensions. 
NOTES 
1 Cluster analytical findings are sensitive to the variables included. Adding a new variable, such 
as another management variable, might make respondents at the edge of one cluster move 
 to another. For this reason we do not use (and do not suggest that others use) cluster 
analysis to make claims about the frequency with which managers adhere to the practices 
of particular clusters. The main value of cluster analysis relates to its ability to identify 
manager types, each marked by distinct constellations of managerial behaviors. We 
acknowledge the limitations of cluster analysis, but we argue that the method is useful for 
taking a holistic approach to studying public management that accounts for the complexity 
and interrelatedness of managerial behaviors. 
2 The students’ achievements in Danish are measured by the mean product of three test scores 
(reading, writing, and spelling); their math achievements by the mean of two test scores 
(arithmetic and mathematical problem-solving). The subjects are given equal weight in the 
final student performance measure. 
3 As with the SFI school principal survey all public lower secondary schools in Denmark were 
surveyed (1,478). The response rate was 52 percent, for a total of 767 respondents.  
4 A total of 1,998 teachers teaching one or more ninth-grade classes in Danish or math in the 
school year of 2010-2011 were surveyed. The response rate was 57 percent, yielding 1,130 
teacher respondents. 
5 As we are not interested in the hierarchical relations of clusters, we use kmeans as opposed to 
hierarchical clustering methods, e.g., single-linkage, average-linkage, complete-linkage, 
Ward’s method. 
6 We ran four kmeans cluster analyses, respectively specifying k at two, three, four, and five. For 
each cluster solution a Calinski-Harabasz pseudo-F index score was computed (with larger 
values indicating a more empirically distinct cluster structure). Increasing k was associated 
with decreasing index scores. However, the score differences were relatively small. Given 
the relevance of a clustering resolution exceeding a binary distinction we thus decided on a 
four-group solution similar to existing typologies (e.g., Miles and Snow 1978). 
7 Analysis of the pairwise correlations among the four outcome measures reveals the following: 
Teacher absenteeism is negatively related to student performance (-.20, p<.1) while teacher 
goal commitment and job satisfaction are positively associated with one another (.33, 
p<.001). 
8 We conducted a robustness test in which we excluded managers at edges of the clusters from 
the sample. To identify these managers, we estimated the (Euclidean) distance between 
 each manager’s responses and the mean responses for the manager’s own cluster. We then 
dropped the five percent of managers with the largest distances (between themselves and 
their own clusters’ means) and reran the regression models. The results are very similar to 
those reported in Table 3. The robustness test thus indicates that our findings are not driven 
by managers who do not fit particularly well into any one cluster. 
APPENDIX 
[INSERT TABLE A-1 HERE] 
[INSERT TABLE A-2 HERE] 
[INSERT TABLE A-3 HERE] 
REFERENCES 
Allison, G. T. 1983. “Public and Private Management: Are They Fundamentally Alike in All 
Unimportant Respects?” Pp. 72-92 in J. L. Perry and K. L. Kraemer, eds., Public 
Management: Public and Private Perspectives. Palo Alto, CA: Mayfield. 
Andersen, J. 2005. ”’Alle’ i 9. klasse vælger at gå til folkeskolens afgangsprøver.” 
Statistikinformation 4(1): 9-11. 
Andersen, L. B. and T. Pallesen. 2008. “Not Just for the Money? How Financial Incentives 
Affect the Number of Publications at Danish Research Institutions.” International Public 
Management Journal 11(1): 28-47. 
Andersen, S. C. and S. C. Winter. 2011. Ledelse, læring og trivsel i folkeskolerne. Copenhagen: 
SFI 11: 47. 
Avolio, B. J. and F. J. Yammarino. 2002. Transformational and Charismatic Leadership: The 
Road Ahead. New York, NY: Erlbaum. 
Barnard, C. I. 1938. The Functions of the Executive. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Bass, B. M. 1999. “Two Decades of Research and Development in Transformational 
Leadership.” European Journal of Work and Organizational Psychology 8(1):9-32. 
Bhatti. Y., M. Gørtz, and L. H. Pedersen. 2015. The Causal Effect of Profound Organizational 
Change When Job Insecurity Is Low—A Quasi-Experiment Analyzing Municipal Mergers. 
Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 26(4): 1185-1220.  
Blake, R. R. and J. S. Mouton. 1964. The Managerial Grid: The Key to Leadership Excellence. 
Houston, TX: Gulf Publishing Co. 
Borins, S. F. 1998. Innovating with Integrity: How Local Heroes Are Transforming American 
Government. Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press.   
Borins, S. F. 2008. Innovations in Government: Research, Recognition, and Replication. 
Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press. 
Boyne, G. A. and R. M. Walker. 2006. “Strategy Content and Public Service Organizations.” 
Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 14(2): 231-52. 
Brewer, G. A. 2006. “All Measures of Performance Are Subjective: More Evidence on US 
Federal Agencies.” Pp. 35-54 in G. A. Boyne, K. J. Meier, L. J. O’Toole, Jr., and R. M. 
 Walker, eds., Public Services Performance: Perspectives on Measurement and 
Management. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.    
Bryson, J. M. 2004. Strategic Planning for Public and Nonprofit Organizations: A Guide to 
Strengthening and Sustaining Organizational Achievements (3e). San Francisco, CA: 
Jossey-Bass. 
Burns, J. M. 1978. Leadership. New York, NY: Harper & Row. 
Calinski, T. and J. Harabasz. 1974. “A Dendrite Method for Cluster Analysis.” Communications 
in Statistics 3(1): 1-27. 
DeCotiis, T. A. and A. Petit. 1978. “The Performance Appraisal Process: A Model and Some 
Testable Hypotheses.” Academy of Management Review 3(3): 635-46. 
DeNisi, A. S. 1996. Cognitive Approach to Performance Appraisal: A Program of Research. 
New York, NY: Routledge. 
DeNisi, A. S., T. P. Cafferty, and B. M. Meglino. 1984. “A Cognitive View of the Performance 
Appraisal Process: A Model and Research Propositions.” Organizational Behavior and 
Human Performance 33(3): 360-96. 
Donahue, A. K., W. S. Jacobson, M. D. Robbins, E. V. Rubin, and S. C. Selden. 2004. 
“Management and Performance Outcomes in State Government.” Pp. 123-51 in P. W. 
Ingraham and L. E. Lynn, Jr., eds., The Art of Governance: Analyzing Management and 
Administration. Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press.    
Drucker, P. F. 1974. Management: Tasks, Responsibilities, Practices. New York, NY: Harper 
and Row. 
Elmore, R. F. 2000. Building a New Structure for School Leadership. Washington, D.C.: Albert 
Shanker Institute. 
Everitt, B. S. 1993. Cluster Analysis (3e). London: Arnold. 
Everitt, B. S., S. Landau, M. Leese, and D. Stahl. 2011. Cluster Analysis (5e). Chichester, UK: 
Wiley. 
Favero, N. and J. Bullock. 2015. “How (Not) to Solve the Problem: An Evaluation of Scholarly 
Responses to Common Source Bias.” Journal of Public Administration Research and 
Theory 25(1): 285-308. 
Favero, N., K. J. Meier, L. J. O’Toole. 2016a. Goals, Trust, Participation, and Feedback: Linking 
Internal Management with Performance Outcomes. Journal of Public Administration 
Research and Theory 26(2): 327-343. 
Favero, N., S. C. Andersen, K. J. Meier, L. J. O’Toole, and S. C. Winter. 2016b. “How Should 
We Estimate the Performance Effect of Management? Comparing Impacts of Public 
Managers’ and Frontline Employees’ Perceptions of Management.” International Public 
Management Journal (ePub ahead of print). doi: 10.1080/10967494.2016.1236763 
Feldman, J. M. 1981. “Beyond Attribution Theory: Cognitive Processes in Performance 
Appraisal.” Journal of Applied Psychology 66(2): 127-48. 
Ferlie, E. 1996. The New Public Management in Action. London: Oxford University Press. 
Fernandez, S.  2005.  “Developing and Testing an Integrated Framework of Public Sector 
Leadership.” Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 15(2): 197-217. 
Fleenor, J. W., J. W. Smither, L. E. Atwater, P. W. Braddy, and R. E. Sturm. 2010. “Self-Other 
Rating Agreement in Leadership: A Review.” The Leadership Quarterly 21(6): 1005-34. 
Gordon, A. D. 1999. Classification (2e). Boca Raton, FL: Chapman & Hall/CRC. 
Gulick, L. and L. F. Urwick. 1937. Papers on the Science of Administration. New York, NY: 
Institute of Public Administration. 
 Hallinger, P. 2003. “Leading Educational Change: Reflections on the Practice of Instructional 
and Transformational Leadership.” Cambridge Journal of Education 33(3): 329-51. 
Halpin, A. W. and B. J. Weiner. 1957. “A Factorial Study of the Leader Behavior Descriptions.” 
Pp. 39-51 in R. M. Stogdill and A. E. Coons, eds., Leader Behavior: Its Description and 
Measurement. Columbus, OH: Bureau of Business Research. 
Hersey, P. and K. H. Blanchard. 1982. Management of Organizational Behavior. Upper Saddle 
River, NJ: Prentice Hall. 
Hicklin, A., L. J. O’Toole, Jr., and K. J. Meier. 2008. “Serpents in the Sand: Managerial 
Networking and Nonlinear Influences on Organizational Performance.” Journal of Public 
Administration Research and Theory 18(2): 253-73. 
Hofstede, G. 1980. “Motivation, Leadership, and Organization: Do American Theories Apply 
Abroad?” Organizational Dynamics 9(1): 42-63. 
Hofstede, G. 1983. “The Cultural Relativity of Organizational Practices and Theories.” Journal 
of International Business Studies 14(2): 75-89. 
Hood, C. 1995. “The “New Public Management” in the 1980s: Variations on a Theme.” 
Accounting, Organizations and Society 20(2): 93-109. 
Ilgen, D. R. and J. M. Feldman. 1983. “Performance Appraisal: A Process Focus.” Research in 
Organizational Behavior 5(1): 141-97. 
Ingraham, P. W., P. G. Joyce, and A. K. Donahue. 2003. Government Performance: Why 
Management Matters. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press. 
Jilke. S. 2016. Job Satisfaction and Regime Change: Evidence from a Natural Experiment. 
International Public Management Journal 19(3): 370-396. 
Katz D. and R. L. Kahn. 1952. “Some Recent Findings in Human Relations Research in 
Industry.” Pp. 650-65 in G. E. Swanson, T. M. Newcomb, and E. L. Hartley, eds., 
Readings in Social Psychology. New York, NY: Holt. 
Katz, D., N. Maccoby, and N. C. Morse. 1950. Productivity, Supervision, and Morale in an 
Office Situation. Ann Arbor, MI: Institute for Social Research. 
Kaufman, L. and P. J. Rousseeuw. 1990. Finding Groups in Data: An Introduction to Cluster 
Analysis. New York, NY: Wiley. 
Kellough, J.E. and H. Lu. 1993. “The Paradox of Merit Pay in the Public Sector: Persistence of a 
Problematic Procedure.” Review of Public Personnel Administration 13(2): 45-64.  
Langbein, L. 2010. “Economics, Public Service Motivation, and Pay for Performance: 
Complements or Substitutes?” International Public Management Journal 13(1): 9-23. 
Latham, G. P., L. Borgogni, and L. Petitta. 2008. Goal Setting and Performance Management in 
the Public Sector.  International Public Management 11(4):385-403. 
Le Grand, J. 2010. “Knights and Knaves Return: Public Service Motivation and the Delivery of 
Public Services.” International Public Management Journal 13(1): 56-71. 
Light, P. C. 2008. A Government Ill Executed: The Decline of the Federal Service and How to 
Reverse It. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Light, P. C. 1998. Sustaining Innovation: Creating Nonprofit and Government Organizations 
that Innovate Naturally. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass. 
Likert, R. 1961. New Patterns of Management. New York, NY: McGraw-Hill. 
Linden, R. M. 1990. From Vision to Reality: Strategies of Successful Innovators in Government. 
Charlottesville, VA: LEL Enterprise.    
Lynn, L. E., Jr. 2003. Public Management. Pp. 14-24 in B. G. Peters and J. Pierre, eds., 
Handbook of Public Administration. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications. 
 McGregor, D.  1960.  The Human Side of Enterprise.  New York: McGraw-Hill.  
Meier, K. J. and L. J. O’Toole, Jr. 2013. “Subjective Organizational Performance and 
Measurement Error: Common Source Bias and Spurious Relationships.” Journal of Public 
Administration Research and Theory 23(2): 429-56. 
Meier, K. J., S. C. Andersen, L. J. O’Toole, Jr., N. Favero, and S. C. Winter. 2015. “Taking 
Managerial Context Seriously: Public Management and Performance in U.S. and Denmark 
Schools.” International Public Management Journal 18(1): 130-50.  
Meyers, M. K. and V. L. Nielsen. 2012. “Street-Level Bureaucrats and the Implementation of 
Public Policy.” Pp. 305-18 in B. G. Peters and J. Pierre, eds., Handbook of Public 
Administration (2e). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications. 
Miles, R. E. and C. C. Snow. 1978. Organizational Strategy, Structure, and Process. New York, 
NY: McGraw-Hill. 
Mintzberg, H. 1973. The Nature of Managerial Work. New York, NY: HarperCollins. 
Moore, M. H. 1995. Creating Public Value: Strategic Management in Government. Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press. 
O’Toole, L. J., Jr., and K. J. Meier. 2011. Public Management. Organizations, Governance, and 
Performance. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press. 
O’Toole, L. J., Jr., and K. J. Meier. 2015. “Public Management, Context, and Performance: In 
Quest of a More General Theory.” Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 
25(1): 237-256. 
O’Toole, L., Jr., and M. J. Pedersen. 2011. ”Skoleledelsens eksterne samarbejde.” Pp. 77-86 in S. 
C. Andersen and S. C. Winter, eds., Ledelse, læring og trivsel i folkeskolerne. Copenhagen: 
SFI 11: 47. 
Pedersen, M. J. 2015. “A ‘Heart of Goal’ and the Will to Succeed: Goal Commitment and Task 
Performance among Teachers in Public Schools.” Public Administration 94(1): 75-88. 
Perry, J. L., T. Engbers, and S. Yun Jun. 2009. “Back to the Future? Performance-Related Pay, 
Empirical Research, and the Perils of Persistence.” Public Administration Review 68(1): 
39-51.  
Pollitt, C. and G. Bouckaert. 2004. Public Management Reform: A Comparative Analysis (2e). 
Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. 
Rainey, H. G. 2009. Understanding and Managing Public Organizations (4e). San Francisco, 
CA: Jossey-Bass. 
Riccucci, N. M. 2005. How Management Matters: Street-Level Bureaucrats and Welfare 
Reform. Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press. 
Shamir, B., R. J. House, and M. B. Arthur. 1993. “The Motivational Effects of Charismatic 
Leadership: A Self-Concept Based Theory.” Organization Science 4(4):577-94. 
Terry, L. D. 2002. Leadership of Public Bureaucracies: The Administration as Conservator (2e). 
Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe. 
Thompson, J. D. 1967. Organizations in Action: Social Science Bases of Administrative Theory. 
New York, NY: McGraw-Hill. 
Yukl, G. 2010. Leadership in Organizations (7e). Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson Prentice 
Hall. 
 
 
 
 
 TABLE 1 
Overview of Key Components of Public Management and their Measures. 
 
Focus of 
activity  
Key components  Measures of school management 
Internal 
management  
Hands-on management vs. 
delegation to middle managers  
 Delegation of decision-making authority 
to middle managers 
Task priority  Task priority: financial and administrative 
management  
 Task priority: professional management 
and managerial tasks related to individual 
students  
 Task priority: personnel management 
 Task priority: strategic management  
Recruitment  Focus on people (vs. production) 
Motivation   Use of reward incentives 
Delegation to employees (trust)  Trust in personnel  
 Involvement in decision-making, teachers 
Use of professional 
instructions/directions  
Monitoring  
 High expectations for teachers and 
students  
 Goal-setting  
 Involvement in teaching practices and 
methods 
 Feedback on teaching 
 Use of written plans 
 Monitoring of goal accomplishment 
 Use of objectives (“management by 
objectives”) 
External 
management  
Networking   Networking 
Buffering   Buffering 1 (pressure from above) 
 Buffering 2 (pressure from below) 
Involvement of board   Involvement of school board in decision-
making 
Both internal and 
external 
Proactivity and innovation  Proactive management (innovation) 
 
 
  
 TABLE 2 
Cluster Analysis. Mean, Standard Deviation (in Parentheses), and Bonferroni-Dunn Test Results 
(in Brackets). 
 
 C1 (n = 157) C2 (n = 50) C3 (n = 131) C4 (n = 127) p>F 
Delegation of decision-making 
authority to middle managers 
-.023 (.807) 
[<C2;>C3] 
.717 (.747) 
[>all] 
-.503 (1.103) 
[<all] 
.266 (.930) 
[<C2;>C3] 
<.001 
Task priority: financial and 
administrative management 
-.374 (.702) 
[<C2&C3] 
.051 (.881) 
[>C1&C4;<C3] 
.849 (1.045) 
[>all] 
-.433 (.728) 
[<C2&C3] 
<.001 
Task priority: professional 
management and managerial tasks 
related to individual students 
.564 (1.056) 
[>all] 
-.544 (.650) 
[<C1] 
-.329 (.854) 
[<C1] 
-.144 (.858) 
[<C1] 
<.001 
Task priority: personnel 
management 
.383 (1.054) 
[>C3&C4] 
.053 (.894) 
[>C3] 
-.566 (.740) 
[<all] 
.090 (.952) 
[<C1;>C3] 
<.001 
Task priority: strategic 
management 
-.249 (.716) 
[<C2&C4;>C3] 
.366 (1.154) 
[>C1&C3;<C4] 
-.628 (.584) 
[<all] 
.811 (.986) 
[>all] 
<.001 
Recruitment: focus on people -.269 (1.100) 
[<C3&C4] 
-.020 (.970) 
- 
.065 (.925) 
[>C1] 
.258 (.880) 
[>C1] 
<.001 
Motivation: use of reward 
incentives 
.013 (.993) 
- 
-.349 (.971) 
[<C4] 
.014 (1.015) 
- 
.107 (.986) 
[>C2] 
.055 
Trust in personnel -.707 (.767) 
[<all] 
-.136 (.943) 
[>C1;<C3&C4] 
.383 (.910) 
[>C1&C2] 
.533 (.828) 
[>C1&C2] 
<.001 
Involvement in decision-making, 
teachers 
-.125 (1.039) 
[>C2;<C4] 
-.642 (.946) 
[<all] 
.131 (.876) 
[>C2] 
.272 (.965) 
[>C1&C2] 
<.001 
High expectations for teachers and 
students 
-.299 (.859) 
[<C3&C4] 
-.323 (1.096) 
[<C3&C4] 
.105 (.982) 
[>C1&C2] 
.389 (.995) 
[>C1&C2] 
<.001 
Goal-setting .054 (.954) 
[>C2] 
-.364 (1.198) 
[<C1&C4] 
-.243 (1.052) 
[<C4] 
.327 (.794) 
[>C2&C3] 
<.001 
Involvement in teaching practices 
and methods 
-.040 (.942) 
[<C4] 
-.255 (.883) 
[<C4] 
-.230 (1.000) 
[<C4] 
.460 (.957) 
[>all] 
<.001 
Feedback on teaching -.020 (.982) 
[>C3] 
.269 (1.027) 
[>C3] 
-.346 (.903) 
[<all] 
.277 (1.003) 
[>C3] 
<.001 
Use of written plans .191 (.825) 
[>C2&C3] 
-.797 (1.027) 
[<all] 
-.380 (1.145) 
[<C1&C4;>C2] 
.470 (.639) 
[>C2&C3] 
<.001 
Monitoring of goal 
accomplishment 
.132 (.895) 
[>C3; <C4] 
.098 (1.136) 
[>C3;<C4] 
-.703 (.867) 
[<all] 
.524 (.773) 
[>all] 
<.001 
Use of objectives (“management 
by objectives”) 
.243 (.799) 
[>C2&C3] 
-1.182 (.847) 
[<all] 
-.258 (1.092) 
[<C1&C4;>C2] 
.431 (.705) 
[>C2&C3] 
<.001 
Networking .393 (.816) 
[>C3] 
.110 (.804) 
[>C3] 
-.635 (1.032) 
[<all] 
.126 (.935) 
[>C3] 
<.001 
Buffering 1 (pressure from above) .088 (.895) 
[>C2] 
-.643 (.973) 
[<all] 
.206 (1.026) 
[>C2] 
-.069 (1.001) 
[>C2] 
<.001 
Buffering 2 (pressure from below) .184 (.786) 
[>C2] 
-1.014 (1.308) 
[<all] 
.240 (.814) 
[>C2&C4] 
-.076 (1.026) 
[>C2; <C3] 
<.001 
Involvement in decision-making, 
school board 
-.099 (.991) 
- 
-.037 (.886) 
- 
.127 (1.082) 
- 
.006 (.961) 
- 
.295 
Proactive management 
(innovation) 
-.086 (.833) 
[>C3;<C4] 
-.121 (1.010) 
[<C4] 
-.406 (.750) 
[<C1&C4] 
.574 (1.153) 
[>all] 
<.001 
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TABLE 3 
OLS Regression. Coefficients and Robust Standard Errors. 
 
 Student 
performance 
Teacher 
absenteeism 
Teacher goal 
commitment 
Teacher job 
satisfaction 
 b se b se b se b se 
C1 (“firefighters”) ref ref ref ref 
C2 (“laissez-faire managers”) .210* (.122) .896 (.715) .323** (.143) .135 (.169) 
C3 (“administrators”) .318*** (.115) -.906* (.479) .405** (.156) .304* (.176) 
C4 (“proactive floor managers”) .151* (.090) -.899 (.554) .272** (.108) .267* (.136) 
Students, females (%) .223 (.354) -3.131 (2.035) .791 (.504) -.216 (.703) 
—, age at time of tests (av.) -1.536** (.643) -1.438 (2.294) -.476 (.547) -.292 (.751) 
—, non-ethnic Danish (%) -.283 (.402) 6.536** (2.805) .068 (.502) -.203 (.593) 
—, mother’s age at birth (av.) .151** (.065) .508* (.302) .203*** (.078) .227** (.104) 
—, father’s age at birth (av.) -.045 (.049) -.438 (.304) -.081 (.058) -.094 (.077) 
—, living with both parents (%) .715 (.439) -6.226* (3.508) -.112 (.660) -.507 (.655) 
—, mother’s education, years (av.) .471*** (.118) .381 (.625) -.209 (.127) -.114 (.139) 
—, father’s education, years (av.) .161 (.106) -.329 (.475) .126 (.126) -.045 (.129) 
School, size (number of students/100) .098** (.045) -.318 (.003) -.001 (.001) -.000 (.001) 
—, number of teachers (full-time eq.) -.010* (.006) .040 (.046) .008 (.008) -.002 (.010) 
—, number of middle managers .024 (.046) .473 (.335) -.117* (.065) .009 (.078) 
—, female teachers (%) .619 (.599) .224 (2.113) 1.120* (.645) .845 (.705) 
—, age of teachers (av.) .027 (.020) -.017 (.062) .042* (.023) -.030 (.024) 
School principal, gender (female) -.113 (.407) -.276 (.422) -.118 (.110) -.188 (.117) 
—, ethnicity -1.814*** (.565) -.246 (1.330) -.267 (.263) .274 (.312) 
—, age .663*** (.151) .072* (.042) -.016* (.009) .016 (.013) 
—, tenure (years) .438 (.284) -.062 (.040) .019** (.009) .012 (.010) 
—, teacher experience (years) .013 (.138) .053* (.039) -.004 (.010) -.022** (.011) 
Constant 17.413 (10.616) 29.000 (39.337) 3.458 (9.489) 4.010 (12.350) 
R2  .63  .24  .19  .13  
N 322  252  203  203  
Notes: *p<.1, **p<.05, ***p<.01. 
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TABLE A-1 
Management Measures. Survey Items, Score Range, Scale Construction, and Reliability. 
 
Management 
measures 
(no. of survey 
items) 
Survey items Score 
range 
Scale 
constru
c-tion 
Cro
n-
bach
’s 
alph
a 
PCA 
factor 
loadi
ngs 
Kurto
sis 
(skew
-ness) 
Delegation of 
decision-making 
authority to 
middle managers 
(6) 
 
 
 
 
 
How much responsibility have you 
delegated to middle managers regarding the 
following work tasks? 
(1) Financial management 
(2) Administrative management 
(3) Professional/pedagogical management 
(4) HR management  
(5) Strategic management  
(6) Managerial tasks related to individual 
students  
1 (no 
delegation 
of 
responsibil
ity) to 5 
(very wide 
delegation 
of 
responsibil
ities) 
Predict
ed 
factor 
scores 
.79  
 
.51 
.67 
.84 
.74 
.71 
.74 
.07 
(-.27) 
Task priority: 
financial and 
administrative 
management (2) 
 
What percentage of your total work time is 
spent on the following job tasks on 
average? 
(1) Financial management  
(2) Other administrative management 
0 to 100 Rowtot
al 
- - 1.75 
(1.00) 
 
Task priority: 
professional 
management and 
managerial tasks 
related to 
individual 
students (2) 
What percentage of your total work time is 
spent on the following job tasks on 
average? 
(1) Professional/pedagogical management 
(2) Managerial tasks related to individual 
students 
0 to 100 Rowtot
al 
- - 1.80 
(.78) 
 
Task priority: 
personnel 
management (1) 
 
What percentage of your total work time is 
spent on the following job tasks on 
average? 
(1) HR management 
0 to 100 Item 
score 
- - 1.96 
(1.03) 
 
Task priority: 
strategic 
management (1) 
 
What percentage of your total work time is 
spent on the following job tasks on 
average? 
(1) Strategic management 
0 to 100 Item 
score 
- 
 
 
- 2.03 
(1.18) 
Recruitment: 
focus on people 
(vs. production) 
(2) 
 
 
 
How much emphasis do you place on the 
following items when hiring new teachers? 
(1) That the applicant seems to fit the 
school’s work culture 
(2) That the applicant is extrovert and 
seems to have good social skills 
1 (no 
emphasis) 
to 5 (very 
great 
emphasis) 
Rowm
ean 
- - .36 
(-.97) 
Motivation: use 
of reward 
incentives (5) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
I recognize particularly good teachers by… 
(1) …recommending them for function-
based salary supplements  
(2) …recommending them for 
qualification-based salary supplements 
(3) …granting specific supplementary 
training requests 
(4) …paying them for overtime for 
exerting an extra effort 
1 (fully 
disagree) 
to 5 (fully 
agree) 
Predict
ed 
factor 
scores 
.74  
.85 
 
.85 
 
.50 
.77 
.50 
-.80 
(.07) 
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 (5) …granting holiday requests outside of 
normal holiday seasons 
Trust in personnel 
(1) 
 
(1) To what extent do you trust teachers at 
your school to exert their best efforts? 
1 (not at 
all) to 5 
(to a very 
wide 
extent) 
Item 
score 
- - -1.00 
(-.31) 
Involvement in 
decision-making, 
teachers (2) 
 
 
 
How much actual influence do you assess 
that the teachers have on decisions that 
apply to your school in the following 
areas?   
(1) Hiring teachers 
(2) Establishing academic performance 
goals for students 
1 (no 
influence) 
to 5 (very 
wide 
influence) 
Rowm
ean 
 
- 
 
- .31 
(-.27) 
High expectations 
for teachers and 
students (2) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Here are sets of opposite statements. How 
would you characterize your style of 
leadership at your school? 
(1) A: School management places very 
high demands on the teachers’ 
classroom teaching at our school 
B: School management hardly places 
any demands on the teachers’ 
classroom teaching at our school. It is 
their own responsibility 
(2) A: Concerning their marks, I and the 
other managers expect that students at 
our school perform better at the final 
exams than similar students at other 
schools 
B: Concerning their marks, I and the 
other managers have no expectations 
with regard to the performance of 
students at this school compared to 
other similar students at other schools 
5 (fully 
agree with 
A) to 1 
(fully 
agree with 
B) 
Rowm
ean 
- - .44 
(-.38) 
 
Goal-setting (4) 
 
 
 
 
 
Has the school established goals for the 
following issues? 
(1) The academic level that the school 
should attain 
(2) What students should learn in each 
subject 
(3) How many students should 
subsequently participate in upper 
secondary education or vocational 
training 
(4) The well-being and social 
development of students 
0 (no); 1 
(yes) 
Rowm
ean 
- - .76 
(-
1.33) 
Involvement in 
teaching practices 
and methods (6) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To what extent has your school 
management actively been involved in 
discussions concerning teachers’ methods 
and organization of their teaching in the 
following ways?  
(1) …participated in a dialogue with 
teachers about teaching methods and 
organization  
(2) …acted as a sparring partner for the 
teachers regarding their teaching 
1 (not at 
all) to 5 
(to a very 
wide 
extent) 
Predict
ed 
factor 
scores 
.78  
 
 
.72 
 
.71 
 
.76 
 
.71 
.25 
(.20) 
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methods and organization of the 
teaching 
(3) …told teachers of research results 
concerning more effective teaching 
methods 
(4) …initiated pilot schemes with new 
teaching methods or ways of 
organizing the teaching with the 
intention of inspiring teachers to use 
them 
(5) …attempted (in group meetings or 
meetings with individual teachers) to 
persuade/inspire teachers to use 
specific teaching methods or ways of 
organizing the teaching 
(6) …attempted to influence teachers’ 
teaching methods or the organization 
of the teaching through the purchase of 
new textbook systems  
 
 
.75 
 
 
 
.52 
Feedback on 
teaching (4) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Please consider the school year of 
2009/2010. How often did the school 
management do the following? 
(1) …gave feedback to teachers 
concerning their classroom teaching 
(2) …discussed teachers’ classroom 
teaching with teachers 
(3) …attended class conferences or similar 
discussions regarding how much the 
individual students benefit from your 
school’s teaching 
(4) …discussed specific problems 
concerning specific classes with one or 
more teachers   
1 (never) 
to 6 (more 
than 50 
times) 
Predict
ed 
factor 
scores 
.80  
 
.82 
 
.86 
.76 
 
 
.72 
-.50 
(.11) 
Use of written 
plans (3) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Are the following management instruments 
used at your school? 
(1) School plan regarding measures for 
achieving the goals of the school 
(2) Plans for the development of the 
individual students in most of the 
classes  
(3) Plans for supplemental teacher training 
0 (no); 1 
(yes) 
Rowm
ean 
 
- - .07 
(-.92) 
 
Monitoring of 
goal 
accomplishment 
(10) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Is the achievement of the school’s goals 
monitored by using any of the following 
tools? 
(1) Analyses comparing the students’ 
GPA over time or among schools  
(2) National tests (before the ninth grade) 
(3) Standardized tests (e.g., in Danish and 
math) 
(4) Analyses of students’ participation in 
subsequent upper secondary education 
or vocational training 
(5) Evaluation surveys among students 
(6) Evaluation surveys among teachers 
(7) Evaluation surveys among parents 
(8) Statistics on student absenteeism 
0 (no); 1 
(yes) 
Rowm
ean 
- - 1.31 
(-.95) 
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 (9) Statistics on teacher absenteeism due 
to illness 
(10) Individual teacher appraisal interviews  
Use of objectives 
(“management by 
objectives”) (2) 
 
 
Are the following management instruments 
used at your school? 
(1) Written objectives specifically for your 
school  
(2) Performance-based management of 
teaching in most of the classes 
0 (no); 1 
(yes) 
Rowm
ean 
 
- - -.76 
(-.76) 
 
Networking (5) How frequently do one or more members 
of your school management meet with the 
following parties? 
(1) Educational psychological counseling 
center (PPR) 
(2) Local education authority 
(3) Social services department or social 
services for children with special needs  
(4) The local teachers’ union or trade 
union representative 
(5) School principals at other primary and 
lower secondary education schools 
5 (weekly) 
to 1 
(annually 
or never) 
Predict
ed 
factor 
scores 
.76  
 
.66 
.85 
.79 
 
.54 
.76 
-.45 
(-.65) 
Buffering 1 
(pressure from 
above) (1) 
 
 
 
 
Here are sets of opposite statements. How 
would you characterize your style of 
leadership at your school? 
(1) A: I and the other managers always 
follow the school legislation and rules  
B: I and the other managers sometimes 
apply a broad interpretation of the 
school legislation and rules 
5 (fully 
agree with 
A) to 1 
(fully 
agree with 
B) 
Item 
score 
- - -.91 
(-.19) 
Buffering 2 
(pressure from 
below) (1) 
 
 
 
 
 
Here are sets of opposite statements. How 
would you characterize your style of 
leadership at your school? 
(1) A: If a teacher experiences a conflict 
with a student’s parents, our school 
management is usually involved early 
on in the process 
B: If a teacher experiences a conflict 
with a student’s parents, the teacher 
usually handles it herself 
5 (fully 
agree with 
A) to 1 
(fully 
agree with 
B) 
Item 
score 
- - .33 
(.92) 
 
Involvement in 
decision-making, 
school board (2) 
 
 
 
How much actual influence do you assess 
that the school board has on decisions that 
apply to your school in the following 
areas?   
(1) Hiring teachers 
(2) Establishing academic performance 
goals for students 
1 (no 
influence) 
to 5 (very 
wide 
influence) 
Rowm
ean 
- 
 
 
- -.20 
(.02) 
 
Proactive 
management 
(innovation) (1) 
 
(1) How many pilot or development 
projects have been initiated at your 
school with the objective of raising the 
academic level of the school within the 
last four years? 
1 (zero) to 
11 (10 or 
more) 
Item 
score 
- - .97 
(1.01) 
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Outcome Measures. Descriptive Statistics and Survey Items and Reliability. 
 
 Survey items Mean 
(standard 
deviation) 
Min Max Cron-
bach’s 
alpha 
PCA 
factor 
loadings 
Kurtosis 
(skew-
ness) 
Student 
performance 
- 6.129 
(1.010) 
1.93 10 - - -.53 
(1.86) 
Teacher 
absenteeism 
(1) 
 
 
(1) What was the average level of 
absenteeism due to illness among 
the teachers in the school year of 
2009/2010 (average number of 
days of short-term absenteeism per 
teacher, i.e., excluding long-term 
absenteeism and maternity leave) 
5.516 
(3.065) 
0 17 - - 1.05 
(1.38) 
Teacher 
goal 
commitment 
(5)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To what extent do you agree or 
disagree with the following statements? 
(1) I know the specific content of the 
school’s goals and values 
(2) My school’s established goals and 
values are concrete and tangible 
(3) I agree on the established school 
goals and values 
(4) In decisions on teaching planning 
and methods I put emphasis on the 
goals and instructions established 
by the school management  
(5) I try hard to meet the school goals 
and values 
0 (1) -
3.58 
1.68 .86  
 
.81 
.85 
 
.90 
.51 
 
 
.91 
-.98 
(2.55) 
Teacher job 
satisfaction 
(3) 
 
 
 
To what extent do you agree or 
disagree with the following statements? 
(1) My work is always really exciting 
and interesting 
(2) I like performing all of my work 
tasks 
(3) I am very satisfied with working at 
the school 
0 (1) -
3.43 
1.23 .76  
 
.85 
.83 
.80 
-.84 
(1.66) 
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TABLE A-3 
Rotating the Omitted Category. Coefficients and Robust Standard Errors (in Parenthesis). 
 
 Student performance Teacher absenteeism Teacher goal commitment Teacher job satisfaction 
 (A) (B) (C) (D) (A) (B) (C) (D) (A) (B) (C) (D) (A) (B) (C) (D) 
C1 (“firefighters”) ref. 
-.210* 
(.122) 
-.318*** 
(.115) 
-.151* 
(.090) 
ref. 
-.896 
(.715) 
.906* 
(.479) 
.899 
(.554) 
ref. 
-.323** 
(.143) 
-.405** 
(.156) 
-.272** 
(.108) 
ref. 
-.135 
(.169) 
-.304* 
(.176) 
-.267* 
(.136) 
C2 (“laissez-faire 
managers”) 
.210* 
(.122) 
ref. 
-.107 
(140) 
.060 
(.119) 
.896 
(.715) 
ref. 
1.802** 
(.693) 
1.795** 
(.750) 
.323** 
(.143) 
ref. 
-.081 
(.185) 
.051 
(.143) 
.135 
(.169) 
ref. 
-.169 
(.203) 
-.132 
(.176) 
C3 (“administrators”) 
.318*** 
(.115) 
.107 
(140) 
ref. 
.167 
(.120) 
-.906* 
(.479) 
-1.802** 
(.693) 
ref. 
-.006 
(.564) 
.405** 
(.156) 
.081 
(.185) 
ref. 
.132 
(.169) 
.304* 
(.176) 
.169 
(.203) 
ref. 
.037 
(.190) 
C4 (“proactive floor 
managers”) 
.151* 
(.090) 
-.060 
(.119) 
-.167 
(.120) 
ref. 
-.899 
(.554) 
-1.795** 
(.750) 
.006 
(.564) 
ref. 
.272** 
(.108) 
-.051 
(.143) 
-.132 
(.169) 
ref. 
.267* 
(.136) 
.132 
(.176) 
-.037 
(.190) 
ref. 
Notes: *p<.1, **p<.05, ***p<.01. 
 
 
 
